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INTRODUCTION
1
The ACCEPT PLURALISM project is concerned with the cultural diversity that 
characterises European societies and the ways in which it is possible to enhance so-
cietal cohesion while respecting ethnic, religious and cultural plurality. The project 
debates the principles, practices, and institutional arrangements that are needed 
to promote tolerance and/or acceptance of cultural differences while maintaining 
social cohesion.
During the first years of the 21st century, Europe has been experiencing increas-
ing tensions between national majorities and ethnic or religious minorities, particu-
larly with marginalised Roma populations and post-migration Muslim communi-
ties. These tensions have at times taken the expression of public riots (e.g. the revolt 
of marginalised youth in France in 2005, riots in northern England in 2001), terror-
ist acts (the London bombings in 2005 and the Madrid bombings in 2004), racially 
motivated violence such as that registered in Italy in the small city of Rosarno in 
Calabria in January 2010 and the pogroms against Asian- or African-looking peo-
ple in inner city areas of Athens in March 2011, or isolated but still tragic murders 
either by fanatic Muslims (like the murder of Van Gogh in the Netherlands), or by 
fanatic chauvinists like the collective murder of 69 young people in Norway in the 
summer of 2011. 
Collateral effects of this malaise, at the political level, are the rise of far right 
wing parties and groupings with explicitly xenophobic and racist agendas targeting 
both native minorities and immigrant communities. While the rise of the far right 
has been registered in several ‘old host’ countries of northern and Western Europe 
1 These indicators have been the fruit of a collective effort: Special thanks to Hara Kouki for providing sources 
on existing indicators and to Inge Versteegt for providing an additional list of what exists ‘out there’, special 
thanks also to Maurizio Ambrosini and Marko Hajdinjak for providing concrete suggestions for additional sub 
indicators or for re-ordering the existing ones, and also to Iseult Honohan and Nathalie Rougier for detailed 
critical comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Jon Fox and Jan Dobbernack for overall remarks and sugges-
tions on how these indicators can fit our theoretical framework and empirical research concerns. This final ver-
sion was edited and completed by a ‘task force’ composed of: Maurizio Ambrosini, Jan Dobbernack, Angéline 
Escafré-Dublet, Jon Fox, Marko Hajdinjak, Lasse Lindekilde, Nathalie Rougier and Anna Triandafyllidou. 
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already in the 1990s (Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy, Vlaamse Blok in 
Flanders, Belgium), the far right is sadly gaining ground also in ‘new host’ countries 
like Greece where both the LAOS and Chrysi Avgi political parties are a new phe-
nomenon and in countries with large native but no immigrant minorities such as 
Hungary with the spectacular rise of the Jobbik party in recent years.
It is in this context that the ACCEPT PLURALISM project has investigated in 
the period 2010-2012 different claims for the accommodation of ethnic, religious 
and cultural diversity in school life and in politics in 16 European countries2. The 
aim of the project is twofold. At the theoretical level, we consider the links between 
different concepts and principles used to inform policies and practices for accom-
modating diversity. We thus elaborate on the concept and practice of tolerance, ac-
ceptance, respect of diversity but also citizenship, multicultural citizenship in par-
ticular, national heritage and national identity; we consider liberalism and liberal 
intolerance, pluralism and plural nationalism.
At the empirical level we assess the main challenges that provoke debates about 
what should not be tolerated, what should be tolerated and what should be not only 
tolerated but actually accepted and respected. We analyse the principles and argu-
ments used in these debates by different social and political actors involved and 
examine the practices of intolerance, tolerance and acceptance registered and/or the 
policies adopted when there is a contested issue.
We particularly investigate two areas of public policy, notably education and 
more specifically challenges that arise in school life; and secondly, politics and is-
sues that concern political life. Through our empirical studies we also seek to iden-
tify what kind of ethnic, cultural or religious diversity claims are considered intoler-
able in European societies. Where are the boundaries between rejection, tolerance 
and acceptance drawn, why and by whom?
Taking into account the different historical experiences of the countries studied 
in the post war period and particularly during the last 20-30 years (in terms of 
state formation/consolidation, native minority accommodation, immigration and 
related policies for integrating migrants) we have sought to highlight the specific 
contexts and traditions of intolerance, tolerance or acceptance and respect of cul-
tural, ethnic and religious diversity in each country. We have looked at contentious 
issues where minority or migrant groups have asked for the accommodation of their 
needs or for the recognition of their own cultural and religious traditions in specific 
institutional and everyday life contexts, in particular in school life and in politics. 
Our contested issues have been selected on the basis of their raising a case for 
tolerance or acceptance of diversity or indeed a case of intolerance or rejection of 
diversity. We have investigated the discourses and concepts evoked by the various 
stakeholders (state actors, civil society, and generally involved social actors such 
as for instance educators, religious leaders, teacher trade unions in the case of 
school life issues, or politicians, activists, journalists, writers and other experts with 
regard to political issues) to deal with the contested issues. In addition, we have 
2 The project covers a wide range of European countries: notably western European states (Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) with a long experience in receiving and incorporating immigrant minori-
ties; ‘new’ migrant host countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland); central European countries that 
have recently joined the EU (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland) and Turkey, an associated state, all countries 
that mostly experience emigration rather than immigration but are also characterised by a significant variety 
of native minority populations.
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investigated the concrete policies and practices adopted in the different countries 
with a view to assessing what are the concepts and principles informing these poli-
cies and practices. 
Apart from investigating theoretically and empirically the challenges that cul-
tural, ethnic and religious diversity raises in European societies and the ways in 
which these are debated and addressed, the ACCEPT PLURALISM project aims at 
creating a tool for assessing the levels of intolerance, tolerance and/or acceptance 
of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in European societies. On the basis of 
our findings from our national case studies and the comparison among them, we 
develop here a set of qualitative tolerance indicators that seek to translate into as-
sessment of Low / Medium / High the presence or absence of specific features in a 
country’s policies, practices and discourses. 
Our indicators assess policies but also discourses and practices. They aim to 
evaluate the overall intolerance/tolerance/acceptance ‘climate’ in a country and not 
just its public policies. They are a tool for assessing whether European societies 
are becoming more or less tolerant in the last decade. The indicators aim to offer 
an overview of the 15 European countries studied. Although they do not cover all 
EU27 member states they cover a number of countries large enough to provide an 
overall assessment of the situation in Europe. 
Last but not least, while the use of these indicators provides a snapshot picture, a 
synchronic evaluation of where each society is positioned on an intolerance / toler-
ance / acceptance scale, these indicators can be used in the future to assess whether 
a given society is becoming more or less tolerant. Alternatively, they can also be 
used to assess the same country in the past and consider how it has developed in 
recent years.
These indicators and our country assessments can function in support of the key 
messages for national and European policy makers that we have elaborated in the 
ACCEPT PLURALISM policy papers.
In introducing the ACCEPT PLURALISM Tolerance Indicators, this paper starts 
by discussing the scope and nature of social indicators in general and briefly reviews 
some widely known types of social indicators. It then proceeds to discuss more spe-
cifically indicators for tolerance and related social phenomena such as democracy, 
social cohesion, citizenship acquisition and practice and of course to present our 
proposed of ethnic and religious tolerance indicators.
1.1 Social Indicators
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) de-
fines a Social Indicator (SI) as a “direct and valid statistical measure which monitors 
levels and changes over time in a fundamental social concern.”  A social concern is 
in turn defined as “an identifiable and definable aspiration or concern of fundamen-
tal and direct importance to human well-being.” 
Indicators may be material, such as numbers related to economic growth, and/
or immaterial, such as values or goals. Atkinson et al. (2002; 2005) consider Social 
Indicators as a parsimonious set of specific indices covering a broad range of social 
concerns. This set may include statistics similar to economic statistics of, for in-
stance, national accounts. Such statistics are intended to provide a basis for making 
concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the conditions of society 
6 THE ACCEPT PLURALISM • Tolerance Indicators Toolkit
regarding important issues of concern such as levels of wealth or poverty, health, 
education, the labour market. 
Social indicators may include simple statistics (e.g. number of children per fam-
ily, number of children per school, number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants) but 
they are often constructed as complex statistical indexes that cover a broader do-
main. For instance, in assessing the quality of life in a given city or country, several 
social indicators are used including demographic features, economic data, environ-
mental data, public attitudes (citizens’ self assessment of their quality of life) and a 
combination of those. 
Social indicators of any kind are socially constructed and historically situated: 
they are specific to a given society at a given historical moment. Indeed, any kind of 
assessment of social concerns includes explicitly or implicitly a value judgement, a 
specific conception of what is ‘good’ for society, and what is a ‘good society’, a ‘good 
life’ or a ‘good policy’. This is an issue of special concern as often measurements 
of ‘quality of life’ are presented as ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ because they measure 
changes in the living standards of people. This tends to neglect that the decision to 
select specific issues to measure and/or improve, is by no means a value free, objec-
tive question; rather, it is an issue that depends on the social and cultural context. 
Second, it is often forgotten that quality of life and related indices include measure-
ments of the subjective well being of people. Der Maesen and Walker (2007) point 
to the fact that there can be a multitude of responses as regards what is a good life, 
that represent the individual preferences of people. Such preferences may be to a 
certain extent culturally defined but always also include an individual component. 
Philips (2006) points to the fact that the inclusion or exclusion of particular do-
mains may be a matter of common sense or up to the individual researcher or policy 
maker. In short, the normative aspects inherent in all social indicators about what 
is ‘social quality’ should not be neglected. The role of social indicator indexes in the 
policy process thus should be always open to question and criticism. 
In addition, many of the items that construct an indicator are related to spe-
cific cultural or religious traditions that characterise a given society. For instance, 
measuring churchgoing on Sunday as an indication of religiosity is not an objective 
expression of religiosity, valid for all religions in all countries at all times, but rather 
it is a measurement of religiosity within a specific religious tradition at a given his-
torical time.
1.2  The usefulness of Social Indicators –  
a word of caution
During the last two decades and in particular during the last five years, there 
has been a proliferation of social indicators (Foa and Tanner 2011). International 
organizations, think-tanks, and academics in the quantitative social sciences have 
designed composite indices to assess broad social science concepts such as good 
governance or human development. A leading role in this area is played by inter-
national organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank. Composite 
indices developed recently include the by now well known Human Development 
Index (HDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the Doing Business (DB) 
indicators, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Think tanks and 
non governmental organisations such as Transparency International or Freedom 
House have created composite indices focusing on specific issues such as the Politi-
cal Rights and Civil Liberties indices, the Quality of Life index, and the Corrup-
tions Perceptions Index (for more, see United Nations 2007, Doing Business 2005, 
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Kaufman et al. 1999, Lambsdorff 2006). Bandura and Martin del Campo (2006 cit. 
in Foa and Tanner 2011), found that of the 160 composite cross-country indices 
now in existence, 83% had been generated since 1991 and 50% in the previous five 
years alone, while, before 1991 there were less than 20% of the composite indices 
found available today.
Foa and Tanner (2011) note that there has been a growing trend of creating 
composite social indices as these present a series of advantages: they have the abil-
ity to summarize complex or multi-dimensional issues in a simple manner (e.g. the 
measurement of GDP per capita provides an overview over the state of an economy 
that would otherwise require a complicated table of the output of different indus-
tries and sectors); they are easier to produce and update regularly and easier to com-
municate to ordinary citizens, including stakeholders. According to Foa and Tanner 
(ibid.) composite indices may also provide a starting point for public debate both at 
the national and international level. For instance, the Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators (1999) or the Ease of Doing Business Index (2001) make the concept of ‘good 
governance’ more palpable and measurable. They also raise the issue of what is and 
ought to be understood by quality of governance.
However, Saltelli (2007) notes also that ill designed composite indicators may 
hide important imbalances and be misleading. For instance, the sustainability in-
dex, cited in a major newspaper, rewarded oil and gas exporting countries higher 
due to the large budget surplus that could be created by higher commodity prices. 
As the author noted, in this case the composite indicator was misinforming readers. 
Foa and Tanner (2011) actually specify the methodological decisions required when 
constructing aggregate measures.
1.3 Examples of Social Indicators
Many well known examples of widely used social indicators concern the area of 
socio-economic development. The World Bank provides for its own Social Indica-
tors of Development3 which contain detailed data regarding human welfare with a 
view to assessing the social effects of economic development. The World Bank web 
site however argues for caution in assessing its indicators’ usefulness: users should 
bear in mind that the concepts, definitions and methodology underlying indicators 
may vary significantly from country to country, and even over time within coun-
tries. The data also are affected by differences in the ways in which information is 
collected. Thus, while indicators are useful for assessing broad trends and differ-
ences, little significance should be attached to small differences among indicators. 
The United Nations is another international organisation which devotes signifi-
cant efforts4 to providing for social indicators. Social indicators covering a wide 
3 The World Bank gathers data for over 170 economies worldwide, omitting only those for which data are 
inadequate. It puts emphasis on country-by-country review. Up to 94 indicators are reported for each country 
including: size, growth, and structure of population; determinants of population growth (including data on 
fertility and infant mortality); labour force; education and illiteracy; natural resources; income and poverty; 
expenditure on food, housing, fuel and power, transport and communication; and investment in medical care 
and education. Each of these indicators is broken into several subcategories. Few indicators are assessed annu-
ally. Rather three different time spans are used (older, moderately recent and more recent, 1990s onwards). For 
more information see www.ciesin.org/IC/wbank/sid-home.html last accessed on 4 May 2012.
4 Their publications are available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/xgrp2.htm and 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/, last accessed on 5 May 2012.
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range of subject-matter fields are compiled by the Statistics Division, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, from many na-
tional and international sources. They consist mainly of a minimum list covering 
population (demographics), housing, work health and education issues. They cover 
the areas identified for follow-up and monitoring by major UN conferences on chil-
dren, population and development, social development and women (United Na-
tions 1996).
Not surprisingly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) also collects socio-economic indicators5 and monitors social and eco-
nomic development in its member countries with a view to providing for a tool for 
assessing and improving policies and performance. OECD indicators are biennial 
and cover a wide range of issues. They are collected from a variety of national and 
international sources and surveys.
OECD indicators are organised in relation to the particular aspect of social life 
that is of concern each time. Thus, there are five categories of indicators: General 
context indicators include household income, fertility, migration, family, old age 
support rate and seek to assess overall the level of socio-economic development of 
a given country. Indicators on self-sufficiency include data on employment/unem-
ployment, student performance, pensionable years, education spending. Equity in-
dicators include data on income inequality, poverty rates, income difficulties, social 
spending. Health indicators include life expectancy, infant mortality, water and air 
quality, public health spending. Last but not least and coming closer to the issues 
that concern us here, OECD measures social cohesion through a set of indicators 
assessing trust, confidence in social institutions, pro- and anti-social behaviour, 
voting, and tolerance. The OECD social cohesion indicators include data from the 
World Gallup Survey, the European Social Value Survey, and the International So-
cial Value Survey. Each social cohesion indicator may be assessed by a single ques-
tion (e.g. people have to agree / disagree with the statement such as “Most people 
can be trusted”) or by a set of questions (e.g. three different questions concerning 
the pro or anti social behaviour of people including whether they donate money, 
participate to civic activities etc.) or may even be a composite indicator (e.g. bring-
ing together the corruption index and the trust in institutions national index to 
assess confidence in social institutions in a given country).
1.4  Indicators in the field of democracy  
and citizenship
In line with the overall proliferation of indicators in assessing social and eco-
nomic well being, in recent years we have witnessed an increase in indicators that 
assess issues related to the wider field of interest of the ACCEPT PLURALISM re-
search project, notably in the field of democracy and citizenship as well as inter-
group cohesion.
5 See www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_37419_2671576_1_1_1_37419,00.html last accessed on 5 
May 2012.
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1.4.1 Democracy Indicators
In a most recent study, Coppedge and Gerring (2011) review the meaning of 
democracy seeking to deconstruct its necessary and sufficient features with a view 
to providing a basis for constructing solid and comprehensive democracy indica-
tors. They point to widely used indicators of democracy such as those constructed 
by Freedom House6 to measure the state of political rights and civil liberties. Their 
political rights index refers to (a) Electoral Process, (b) Pluralism and Participa-
tion, and (c) Functioning of Government. The Civil Liberties index comprises (a) 
Freedom of Expression, (b) Association and Organizational Rights, (c) Rule of Law, 
and (d) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. Freedom House employs these 
two indices (“Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties”) in tandem. Each index extends 
back to 1972 and covers most sovereign and semi-sovereign nations. Polity IV7 pro-
vides two aggregate indices, “Democracy” and “Autocracy,” usually used in tandem 
(by subtracting one from the other), which provides the Polity2 variable. Cover-
age extends back to 1800 for most sovereign countries with populations greater 
than 500,000. The Democracy/Dictatorship indicator (DD, see Alvarez, Cheibub, 
Limongi, and Przeworski 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) codes coun-
tries dichotomously (democracy/dictatorship), including most sovereign countries 
from 1946 to the present. 
1.4.2 Citizenship Indicators and Statistics
The most widely used among these is the MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy 
Index) access to nationality index. The MIPEX offers an attempt to measure poli-
cies in the realm of immigrant integration against a standard of best practice drawn 
from Council of Europe Conventions or European Community Directives. Data are 
collected by means of expert surveys in which the respective national legislations 
are evaluated. It has gained wide currency and recognition in the past 4-5 years at 
the European level.8
The Howard’s Citizenship Policy Index CPI based on data from the NATAC 
project (The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and 
Quantitative Developments) integrates three elements (ius soli, naturalisation re-
quirements, and dual citizenship). It offers a straightforward indicator as it is based 
on information that is clearly specified in national laws.9
A recent attempt of measuring citizenship rights of immigrants are the Indica-
tors of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) indicators has been developed by 
Ruud Koopmans and his collaborators (see Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibal, 
2012). The ICRI indicators include 42 sub-indicators which involve not only le-
gal but also cultural aspects that depend on jurisprudence, administrative decrees 
6 www.freedomhouse.org
7 www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
8 For details see www.mipex.eu 
9 The earliest attempt for a citizenship and integration policy index was the LOI Legal Obstacles to Integration 
Index. There are two more indexes: the Thomas Janoski’s Barriers to Naturalization Index BNI and the Sara 
Wallace Goodman’s CIVIX index for naturalisation tests. One may observe that citizenship law and practice 
and citizenship acquisition are important aspects of migrant integration which can relatively easily be assessed 
and quantified, hence they attract a lot of interest in terms of developing related indicators. They are also seen 
as cardinal for overall social and economic integration assessments.
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and local implementation practices – information that is quite difficult to find and 
code. Both Howard (2009: 32-35) and Koopmans et al. (2010: 12-13) use correla-
tion tests to compare their own indicators with each other and in addition make a 
comparison with the Migration Integration Policy Indices (MIPEX) (MPG 2006). 
Koopmans and collaborators additionally compare their indicator with the Legal 
Obstacles to Integration-Index (LOI, Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997).
A more comprehensive set of citizenship indicators is currently being developed 
by the EUDO project. EUDO Citizenship Law Indicators (CITLAW) aim to de-
scribe and compare characteristic aspects of citizenship laws across countries and 
over time. They include a large set of indicators based on a classification of citizen-
ship law provisions that serve specific purposes, such as securing the intergenera-
tional continuity of the citizenry through birthright acquisition, determining the 
extent of territorial inclusion of the resident population through ius soli and resi-
dence requirements for naturalisation, regulating the overlap with other state’s citi-
zenship regimes through restrictions or toleration of multiple citizenship, maintain-
ing citizenship links with extraterritorial populations and defining target groups 
and conditions for regular or facilitated naturalisation.
CITLAW indicators serve primarily for comparing specific aspects of citizenship 
regimes across countries and time. In addition, the EUDO Project provides for citi-
zenship acquisition rates (CITACQ indicators) which collect data in order to meas-
ure, compare and explain the quantitative aspects of citizenship acquisition across 
Europe. They present data about citizenship acquisition in European countries with 
a specific focus on the naturalisation of immigrants. Data are derived from publicly 
accessible national sources in countries covered by the project EUDO CITIZEN-
SHIP. These sources are typically national statistics agencies, but also Ministries of 
Justice or Home Affairs, Immigration and Naturalisation Services, or Immigration 
Boards. EUDO CITACQ aims to cover a broad set of modes of acquisition. For 
each country, insofar as these are available, users can find aggregate data from 1985 
onwards on the following characteristics of citizenship acquisitions: total number 
of acquisitions, mode of acquisition (procedure), citizenship of origin, country of 
birth, region of residence, sex, age, decisions on applications for naturalisation. The 
EUDO project also provides indicators for Citizenship Implementation comparing 
the formal aspects of acquisition procedures and Citizenship Integration indicators 
assessing the impact of citizenship and migrant integration.10 
1.4.3 Inter-group Cohesion Indicators
Several quantitative studies on public attitudes have measures on inter-group 
cohesion. The concept of inter-group cohesion is based on the broader notion of 
social cohesion, which is defined by the Council of Europe as: ‘the capacity of a 
society to ensure the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and 
avoiding marginalisation’ (Council of Europe 2009). A more academic definition 
is provided by Beck and co authors (1997: 284): ‘Social cohesion concerns the pro-
cesses that create, defend or demolish social networks and the social infrastructures 
underpinning these networks. An adequate level of social cohesion is one which 
enables citizens “to exist as real human subjects, as social beings”’. Berman and 
Philips (2004: 2) note that social cohesion is inextricably related to the existence of 
10 For more see http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators
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legislative frameworks for legal, political and social protection, of cultural norms 
and mores relating to citizenship, cultural pluralism, tolerance and respect; to the 
existence of a vibrant civil society. At the normative level, social cohesion implies 
the maximisation of solidarity and shared identity. There is, however, an inherent 
tension between solidarity and homogeneity. 
We understand social cohesion as closely related to social quality, where social 
quality is defined as ‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the so-
cial and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their 
well-being and individual potential’ (Beck et al., 1997:3 cit. in Berman and Philips 
2004:1). In this case, social cohesion entails the sort of solidarity that facilitates and 
nurtures group membership and loyalty while at the same time respecting diversity 
and difference (Joppke and Lukes, 1999).
It follows from the above that measuring social cohesion includes an important 
component of measuring inter-group cohesion. Indeed, the degree of tolerance/ac-
ceptance of minority groups is a measurable dimension of social cohesion. 
Below we present a list of measurements used to assess inter-group cohesion, 
which are closely related to the measurement of discrimination but also to the levels 
of tolerance/acceptance of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity.
Interestingly, the above measurements concern the self-assessment of respond-
ents either of their own situation or of the situation of other groups in their country 
and/or their own level of tolerance/acceptance of specific minority groups or types 
of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. Assessing inter-group cohesion actually 
brings us very close to the wider field of assessing social and political tolerance.
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 Table: Examples of Indicators Measuring Inter-Group Cohesion
SOURCE WHAT
Fund for Peace Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
Rating on level of uneven economic development along group lines
Minorities at Risk Level of economic and political discrimination against minorities in country, 
aggregated by group
World Values Survey “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that 
you would not like to have as neighbors.” People of a different race or caste, 
percentage mentioned
“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you 
would not like to have as neighbors.” People of a different religion, percentage 
mentioned 
“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you 
would not like to have as neighbors.” People of a different language, percentage 
mentioned
“I now want to ask you how much you trust various groups of people. Using the 
responses on this card, could you tell me how much you trust people of another 
religion?” Percentage who trust “not very much” or “not at all”
“I now want to ask you how much you trust various groups of people. Using the 
responses on this card, could you tell me how much you trust people of another 
nationality?” Percentage who trust “not very much” or “not at all”
Latinobarometer On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘there is no discrimination’ and 10 is ‘there is a 
lot of discrimination’, could you tell me if there is or is not discrimination against 
indigenous people in [this country] in the [workplace/courts/school system/
political parties/police]?” Average level, among all respondents in country who 
identify as indigenous or mestizo
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'there is no discrimination' and 10 is 'there is a 
lot of discrimination', could you tell me if there is or is not discrimination against 
indigenous people in [this country] in the [workplace/courts/school system/
political parties/police]?" Average level, among all respondents in country who 
identify as black or mulatto
“As far as you know or have heard, which of the following groups is most 
discriminated against in this country - or are there no such groups?” Combined 
percentage citing: blacks, indigenous peoples, mulattos, mestizos, Asians, Arabs, 
Jews, immigrants, the disabled, those with AIDS.
Afrobarometer Proportion of population reporting that their economic situation is the ‘same’ as 
other ethnic groups in country
Proportion of population reporting that their political situation is the ‘same’ as 
other ethnic groups in country
Proportion of population reporting that their ethnic group is ‘never’ treated 
unfairly in country
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of the sources quoted.
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TOLERANCE
INDICATORS
Studying tolerance through quantitative indicators has developed as a field of 
political inquiry within the larger domain of measuring the quality of democracy in 
modern societies. Tolerance is seen as a necessary precondition, although not a suf-
ficient one, for democracy by itself, regardless of context (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; 
Lipset, 1959; Mill, 1859). 
Survey studies of political tolerance were pioneered by researchers in the US in 
the 1950s and 1960s mainly in connection to Cold War fears and the Civil Rights 
movement. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to 
policies that challenged the levels of intolerance of the white majority. Widmalm 
and Oscarsson (2008) note that Stouffer’s seminal study 1955 and his continued 
work in 1973 laid the ground for how most studies have since formulated surveys 
on political tolerance. Levels of political tolerance/intolerance in a society are meas-
ured by asking respondents to name the most disliked group in society. Then the 
respondent is asked questions about which rights should be extended to this least 
liked group. The rationale of this type of measurement of political tolerance is that a 
tolerant person may disagree on what other people think and say, but s/he may want 
to protect their right to be different. During the last 20 years, there has been a large 
number of quantitative studies assessing how various socio-economic factors, for 
example, levels of education, religious preferences, ideological preferences, gender, 
or ethnic origin are associated with levels of political tolerance (Cigler & Joslyn, 
2002; Gibson, 1995, 2002; Gibson, 2006; Mutz, 2002; Persell, Green & Gurevich, 
2001; Reimer & Park, 2001)
Widmalm and Oscarsson (2008) distinguish between social and political toler-
ance. Political tolerance is measured on the basis of Stouffer’s questions as described 
above (for instance should the most disliked group be allowed to hold public dem-
onstrations?). Social tolerance is measured through the classical ‘neighbour ques-
tion’. Notably people are asked to say whether they would object to have people of 
different race, immigrants, homosexuals, and people who have AIDS, respectively, 
as neighbours.
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Similar to the above, the Civic Education Project Survey11 measures several di-
mensions of civic and social engagement which include political engagement, civic 
engagement, voting, trust, political knowledge and tolerance. Tolerance is typically 
defined as respect for the civil liberties, particularly free speech rights, of unpopular 
groups. The Civic Education Project Survey includes an especially stringent test of 
political tolerance because they focus on antidemocratic groups. Respondents are 
asked whether “members of groups that are against democracy” should be allowed 
democratic participation and free speech such as host television shows, hold dem-
onstrations, run for office, or making public speeches.
The OECD indicator on tolerance, on the other hand, differs from the above. 
Drawing upon the Gallup12 World Poll, the OECD tolerance index is the ratio of the 
people who respond yes to the question of whether the city or area where they live is 
11 http://civiceducationproject.org/survey/index.php.html 
12 The Gallup World Poll is conducted in over 140 countries around the world based on a common question-
naire, translated into the predominant languages of each country. With few exceptions, all samples are probabil-
ity based and nationally representative of the resident population aged 15 years and over in the entire country, 
including rural areas. Sample sizes vary between around 1,000 and 4,000, depending on the country.
The New Zealand social survey on the impact of education offers however a more developed and 
detailed measure of tolerance as a public attitude. It distinguishes between tolerance of ethnic diversity, 
tolerance of immigrants and tolerance of different values and ways of living:
Tolerance of Ethnic Diversity (Is it good for NZ to be made up of different ethnic groups?)
Tolerance of Immigrants (Is it good for NZ to have immigrants who are from many different cultures)
Tolerance of different values and ways of living (Is it good that people in NZ can have different values? 
Is it good that people in NZ can have different ways of living)
The NZ survey found that 83% of New Zealanders aged 25 to 64 in the NZGSS agreed strongly or 
very strongly that ethnic diversity is a good thing. The survey also found that tolerance of ethnic diver-
sity was moderately to strongly associated with education. The likelihood of agreeing strongly or very 
strongly was highest for those with bachelors or postgraduate qualifications. Those with no qualifica-
tions, level 1 school qualifications or level 1 to 4 tertiary certificates were less likely to agree. 
The same survey also found that 68% of New Zealanders aged 25 to 64 in the NZGSS agreed strongly 
or very strongly that it was good to have immigrants fro many different cultures. Agreement was again 
positively associated with higher levels of education. This association was strong for NZ-born. It was 
weaker but still present for overseas-born adults. 
93% of New Zealanders aged 25 to 64 in the NZGSS agreed strongly or very strongly with the first 
question on values (notably that it was good to have in NZ people with different values). 91% agreed 
strongly or very strongly with the second question notably that it is good that people in NZ have different 
ways of living. Education was positively associated with both these indicators. But unlike other indica-
tors, this positive association was only present for those who agreed ‘very strongly’. When those who 
agreed ‘strongly’ were considered together with those who agreed ‘very strongly’, there was no apparent 
association between these indicators and education. These were the only indicators from those selected 
for this report where the relationship of these first two positive responses had a different relationship.
For more see: www.educationcounts.govt.nz/publications/schooling/78889/1.-summary
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a good place or not a good place to live for ethnic minorities, migrants, or gay or les-
bian people to all people contacted. In other words, here the measurement is more 
indirect. Instead of asking people whether they agree or disagree with the ‘neigh-
bour question’ or the ‘democratic rights’ question, respondents are asked to evaluate 
their own community. This takes away somehow the value judgement inherent in 
these two questions. It makes it more neutral and seeks to assess the conditions of 
life intersubjectively rather than measure the attitudes of respondents. 
While the above indicators may be seen as partly overlapping they are probably 
better than the neighbour test or the political tolerance question because they seek 
to measure attitudes towards ethnic diversity as such, cultural and value diversity 
and finally diversity linked with immigration. 





Interestingly none of the above tolerance indicators measures actual policies 
concerning cultural diversity and/or practices that address the claims of minority 
and immigrant groups. They measure either public attitudes or the self-assessment 
of the levels of toleration or acceptance in a community by the people who live in 
it. At the same time there is a wide set of social indicators covering related fields 
such as the quality of democracy, citizenship policies and practices, and intergroup 
cohesion. 
Our set of Tolerance Indicators comes to fill a gap within this rich literature of 
social indicators, looking at two specific areas of public life that we believe are of 
paramount importance for shaping social quality in a society. These two fields are 
education and school life: the Tolerance In School Life Indicators; and politics/public 
life: the Tolerance in Politics Indicators.
Our Indicators measure qualitative aspects of societies’ response to minorities 
and migrants. They offer relative measures (low / medium / high) that form the 
basis for a comparative account of toleration and acceptance across Europe. 
They aim to evaluate the tolerance/intolerance situation in society at a given 
point in time. Our assessment is focused, qualitative and contextually informed 
and includes not only policy and legislative frameworks but also to the extent possi-
ble social practices which may go beyond policy arrangements and legal rules. Such 
practices indirectly reflect public attitudes although they are not totally conditioned 
by the latter.
The indicators are qualitative in nature. They capture different aspects of the 
toleration or acceptance of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in school life and 
in political life, and are expressed in the form of scores - Low/Medium/High - in 
a particular issue/field and sub-field. 
Let us briefly introduce the rationale of these scores, in particular the important 
distinction between toleration and acceptance, as well as offer some comments re-
garding the thematic areas where they are applied.
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Toleration and Acceptance
These scores are based on the definition of tolerance elaborated in the ACCEPT 
PLURALISM project and in particular on our main distinction between tolerance 
and acceptance. Tolerance is understood as a minimal concept that involves non-
interference with practices or forms of life of others even if one disapproves of 
them. Tolerance is in this sense about negative equality: it requires non-interference 
and non-discrimination more than positive pro-active policy measures or social 
practices that would ensure equal treatment for minorities and their members.
By contrast, acceptance of cultural ethnic and religious diversity may involve 
the re-making of the public space through appropriate institutions and policies 
that actively recognise cultural diversity or that work towards socio-economic 
inclusion and equal treatment. 
Acceptance involves both respect (for cultural difference) and equality (in mat-
ters of cultural or socio-economic rights). For many immigrant populations and 
post-immigration groups it is in particular respect for ethnic or religious identities 
and their accommodation in public institutions, school life and politics that is at 
stake. For socio-economically marginalized populations (such as for instance Roma 
populations across Europe) tolerance, but also decency and respect may be seen 
to require most importantly socio-economic inclusion and measures that work to-
wards substantive equality.13 
On the basis of this important distinction between tolerance and acceptance, we 
identify three classes of how cultural difference can be debated, accepted or rejected:
1. Intolerance/rejection;
2. Toleration;
3. Acceptance: recognition and respect as equal and admission as normal 
In line with the above we specify three scores for our indicators:
low = cultural, ethnic and religious minority and immigrant needs are ignored, no 
accommodation. Minorities/immigrants and their deviation from ‘normal’ prac-
tice are stigmatised and/or outlawed. Minorities/immigrants are excluded from 
participating fully in aspects of social life.
medium = promotes minimal tolerance of diversity and limited opportunities for 
minority inclusion. Individual and group difference is allowed to exist within the 
public space but no special measures are taken towards their accommodation and 
inclusion. 
high = promotes positive acceptance/accommodation of diversity, not only makes 
room but also offers arrangements for recognising the needs of minority or immi-
grant pupils; ensures equality and decent treatment; respects minority choices and 
ensures participation. 
13 Respect and equality are two important parts of any understanding of social justice (see Parekh 2004, Tully 
2000, Fraser and Honneth 2003). They often appear in conjunction and minorities with grievances regarding 
the marginalization of their identity claims (such as Muslim populations in many European countries) also 
tend to be economically disadvantaged. Yet it is empirically evident that equality and respect do not always 
overlap. In fact, the misapplication of either perspective risks harming the interests of the minority populations 
in question. This is not meant to suggest that the two objectives are mutually exclusive; it means that there are 
two injustices that are different in kind and that both require our concern in addressing contemporary Euro-
pean diversity challenges with these indicators and more generally.
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Thematic areas
ACCEPT PLURALISM applies these scores in two sets of indicators that refer to 
two different thematic areas: indicators that concern education and school life; and 
indicators that concern politics and public life. Where this distinction is appropri-
ate, we develop separate indicators of ethnic diversity tolerance and indicators of 
religious diversity tolerance. 
Let us explain the reason for doing so.
In many cases, the terms cultural and ethnic diversity are used interchangea-
bly or as synonyms while they are generally distinguished from religious diversity. 
Looking closely into educational and political realities one realises that tolerance 
towards ethnic and towards religious diversity does not necessarily go hand in hand. 
The reasons are twofold: ethno-cultural groups and religious minorities overlap 
only partly without however completely coinciding. Thus, the term ‘Muslims’ may 
encompass people of several ethnic and national affiliations. By contrast, the term 
‘Roma’ may refer to people who are Christian or Muslims or have no religion. Mi-
grant populations are often culturally distinct from the majority populations both 
in ethnic and religious terms. For instance, Moroccans in Italy are both ethnically 
and religiously defined as a minority. In Europe, ethnic and cultural minorities are 
often native ones while religious minorities (and in particular Muslims) more often 
than not find their origins in immigration. 
Contemporary European societies put great emphasis on their qualities as lib-
eral, secular and democratic. The liberal and secular character of these societies is 
often seen to be in contrast to the claims of religious minorities. In countries like 
France religion is not accepted as a legitimate form of diversity to be accommodated 
in the public space. This rejection does not regard specific religions but rather aims 
at making the public space completely secular and neutral. This separation of the 
state and the church and the confinement of religion to the private sphere is not as 
complete as the French state, adopting an increasingly narrow understanding of 
laïcité, may require it to be. Yet given this increased sensitivity of European societies 
towards religion and religious diversity, we consider it necessary to assess separately 
ethnic/cultural and religious tolerance. Regarding the role of religion in public life 
as well as regarding significant differences between understandings of ‘acceptance’ 
of religious and ethnic ‘difference’ our qualitative indicators are contextually nu-
anced without being culturally relativist.
Our Tolerance Index translates qualitative evaluations into comparative as-
sessments: low, medium and high. We apply these assessments in areas of interest 
within the fields of education and politics – such as the school curriculum or mi-
nority representation in politics (see below) – to evaluate policies and practices of 
minority/immigrant accommodation. We are not concerned with public attitudes 
and opinion polls as most social and political tolerance measurements have done so 
far. We rather offer a qualitative assessment of the situation in each country with a 
view to using these indicators as a policy tool for monitoring and self-assessment 
as well as possibly policy development in the field of cultural, religious and eth-
nic diversity.
We thus offer a three-level assessment of areas that are relevant to determine 
levels of acceptance in each country under study. While we believe that our indica-
tors are unique in offering this three-level assessment, we recognise that our pro-
posed indicators have also an important limitation, they only focus on two areas of 
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public life and public policy: education/school life and politics. While the selection 
of these two areas leaves out important fields that become sites of contention in rela-
tion to cultural diversity such as welfare policies and practices, citizenship policies 
or media regulations, we have adopted this limited approach on purpose. The main 
reason is that indicators assessing citizenship policies are successfully implemented 
by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX www.mipex.eu), are currently fur-
ther developed by the EUDO project (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators), while 
media diversity indicators have most recently been developed and implemented by 
the MEDIVA project (www.mediva.eu).
3.1 School Life Indicators
Our Tolerance in Schools indicators are organised by reference to the various 
components of school life and seek to take into account the various dilemmas, 
claims and contested issues that may arise in the daily life of schools in the coun-
tries studied. They are based on our empirical and theoretical analysis of challenges 
that schools in the 16 European countries studied face when dealing with ethnic, 
cultural and religious diversity. Our Tolerance in School Life indicators are organ-
ised into three sets:
Indicator 1: Presentation of self and interaction in the school
  This indicator looks at various aspects of everyday school life and on how students, teachers 
and parents interact in the school context. It includes issues of dress code, organisation of 






Indicator 2: Curriculum and Pedagogy
  This set of indicators looks at how the school curriculum and pedagogical philosophy pro-
motes tolerance and/or acceptance of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. It investigates 
this both at the level of curriculum subjects and organisation and at the level of special ar-





Indicator 3: Structure of the Education System
  This set of indicators considers whether the structure of the education system is conducive to 
the well-being of ethnic or religious minority groups and offers mechanisms and institutions 
to respond to their claims for tolerance and acceptance.
	 •		Parallel	education	(voluntary)	–	ethnic	or	religious	schools	as	a	matter	of	minority	choice
	 •		Desegregation	–	integrated	schools	and	classrooms	as	a	matter	of	minority	choice
	 •		Financial	 investment	 –	 public	 education	 opportunities	 for	 socio-economic	 improvement	




ment of minority children
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All indicators are preceded by the following question: 
Which of the following sentences best reflects the situation in schools of your 
country/region14?
Indicators are assessed by researchers on the basis of data collected concerning 
relevant policies, practices and discourses. 
In the ACCEPT PLURALISM project, we implement these indicators in a 
pilot study on the basis mainly of the data collected during our case studies on 
school life and supported by relevant scholarly literature or survey data where 
necessary. This pilot study applies the three sets of school life indicators in selected 
countries, namely those where there are significant challenges in the area in ques-
tion.
If the indicators were to be used to assess past conditions or re-used to assess 
conditions in the future, they should still be assessed by experts (be they research-
ers or policy makers) on the basis of a focused and contextual analysis. Indicators 
apply to mainstream – state funded or private schools – except otherwise stated (see 
indicator 3 on the structure of the education system).
14 In some of the countries studied education is a regional or local policy issue. In those cases, the tolerance 
indicator is assessed for the region in question and not for the entire country
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Indicator 1.1
MINORITY DRESS CODE 
FOR PUPILS
LOW – non tolerance
There are different provisions regarding minority and majority religions: Thus (where 
religious symbols are authorized) only majority religious symbols are allowed while 
minority religious symbols are banned. 
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
No matter what the type of school and its rules regarding dress/uniform, there is a level 
of practical accommodation: for instance minority religion pupils are allowed to change 
inside the school if religious dress is not authorised within the school but required by 
some pupils in their daily life.
HIGH – acceptance 
Conditions are equally applied: any permission and/or restrictions concerning religious 
dress code affect equally minority and majority religion pupils.
Indicator 1.2 
MINORITY DRESS CODE 
FOR TEACHERS
LOW – non tolerance
There are different provisions regarding minority and majority religions: Thus (where 
religious symbols are authorized) only majority religious symbols are allowed while 
minority religious symbols are banned.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
No matter what the type of school, there is a level of practical accommodation: for 
instance minority religion teachers are allowed to change inside the school if religious 
dress is not authorised within the school but required by some teachers in their daily 
life.
HIGH – acceptance 
Conditions are equally applied: any permission and/or restrictions concerning religious 




LOW – non tolerance
Teachers or school principals organise consultation meetings between parents and 
teaching staff without the participation of minority parents or without assuring that 
migrant or minority parents receive and comprehend relevant information. There are 
no provisions in place to address linguistic or cultural obstacles that affect migrant or 
minority participation in consultations.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Teachers or school principals organise consultative meetings with migrant or minor-
ity parents but there are only minimal measures in place to make sure that parents 
understand the relevant issues affecting them. There is some, but no sustained, effort to 
ensure that linguistic or cultural obstacles towards parental participation are addressed.
HIGH – acceptance 
Teacher-parent consultations are organised in a way that ensures that migrant or mi-
nority parents receive the relevant information and achieve an understanding of the 
local issues as well as of the school system more generally. Where there are obstacles in 
the way of parental participation in these meetings, special efforts are made to ensure 
the full participation of migrant/minority parents.
INDICATOR 1
Presentation of self and interaction in the school





LOW – non tolerance
The school calendar is organised on the basis of the national majority religion. No devi-
ations are allowed – absence of minority or immigrant children on days of their group’s 
religious celebration are not justified. No consideration of such celebrations is taken in 
the school exam, trip or other activities’ calendar organisation.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The school calendar of festivities and activities follows closely that of the national ma-
jority religion but minority and immigrant students can have their absences justified. 
Requests for rescheduling of some activity or exam can be individually examined and 
possibly accommodated.
HIGH – acceptance 
The school calendar celebrates the religious festivities of major groups in society, not 
only of the majority. While for instance there may be longer holidays for the Christmas 





LOW – non tolerance
The school calendar is organised on the basis of the dominant nation celebrations. No 
deviations are allowed – absence of minority or immigrant children on days of their 
group’s ethnic or national day celebrations is not justified. No consideration of such 
celebrations is taken in the school exam, trip or other activities’ calendar organisation.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The school calendar of festivities and activities follows closely that of the national ma-
jority but minority and immigrant students can have their absences justified. Requests 
for rescheduling of some activity or exam can be individually examined and possibly 
accommodated.
HIGH – acceptance 
The school calendar celebrates the ethnic/national festivities of major groups in society, 
not only of the majority. The school takes a day off as appropriate or organises a similar 
event to celebrate both majority and minority national/ethnic celebration days.
Indicator 1.6
MODE OF CELEbRATION 
OF NATIONAL / ETHNIC 
FESTIvITIES
LOW – non tolerance
The school organises festivities only in relation to the national majority celebration 
days. There is no consideration of minority festivities and/or of difficulties that minor-
ity or migrant children may have in taking part in these festivities (because for instance 
their ethnic or religious community may be negatively portrayed in these festivities 
as ‘inferior’ or ‘inimical’ to the national majority). Participation in these festivities is 
obligatory for the students.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The school organises festivities only in relation to the national majority celebration 
days. However, participation in these festivities is not obligatory for minority and mi-
grant children if they feel uncomfortable.
HIGH – acceptance 
The school organises celebrations not only for the national majority festivities but also 
celebrates important days for ethnic minorities (E.g. national independence days or 
days relating to the special cultural or ethnic tradition of a given group. Festivities or-
ganised by the school with the explicit aim of bringing majority children closer to the 
special traditions, music, folklore of minority cultures also qualify here). Majority and 
minority pupils are required to participate to both.
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Indicator 1.7
MODE OF CELEbRATION 
OF RELIGIOUS FESTIvITIES
LOW – non tolerance
The school organises religious celebrations only in relation to the national majority reli-
gion. There is no consideration of the different faith of minority or immigrant children. 
Participation in these festivities is obligatory for the students.
OR
Religious festivities are excluded from the school programme. The school applies a 
strongly secular approach.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The school organises celebrations/special events only in relation to the national major-
ity religious festivities. However, participation is not obligatory for minority and mi-
grant children if they are of a different religion.
HIGH – acceptance 
The school organises celebrations not only for the national majority religious festivities 
but also for minority religious celebrations (e.g. the end of the Ramadan, or the Jewish 
Passova). Both majority and minority pupils are required to participate to both.
Indicator 1.8
PROvISIONS FOR FORMAL 
PRAYER FOR MINORITY 
RELIGIONS AT SCHOOL
LOW – non tolerance
Minority/immigration pupils are banned from prayer or other forms of worship during 
school hours and on school premises, including during breaks and free time.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Some arrangements are in place to facilitate individual prayer/worship. This can include 
exemptions for religious pupils during breaks and/or space made available on school 
premises. No particular measures towards inter-faith understanding are in place. 
HIGH – acceptance 
There is an active effort by school authorities to accommodate prayer/worship. Space is 
provided if necessary for groups of pupils to congregate. Where there are possible con-
flicts with the requirements of education or the school day, compromises are negotiated 
in good faith. There is an active effort by school authorities to provide for understand-
ing between (differently) religious and non-religious pupils.
Indicator 1.9
COLLECTIvE WORSHIP
LOW – non tolerance
Where it exists, collective worship during school hours or other ceremonies of a pri-
marily symbolic purpose reflect majority beliefs and either ignore or reject beliefs of 
minority/immigrant pupils.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Where it exists, religious minority or non-religious pupils are exempted from collective 
worship.
HIGH – acceptance 
Religious meetings, where such meetings are organised, take positively into account 
the diversity of beliefs in the student body and seek to promote mutual respect and 
understanding.





LOW – non tolerance
There is no civic education course in lower high school (around the 11-15 age bracket) 
and/or civic education only includes teaching on the country’s political system and in-
stitutions with no reference to the cultural, ethnic or religious diversity of the country.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Civic education courses include specific references to cultural, ethnic or religious di-
versity, however the courses are taught in an abstract or general way without present-
ing students with questions about particular examples pertaining to real situations that 
they may face in and out of school.
HIGH – acceptance 
Civic education courses give significant priority to the value of cultural, ethnic and re-
ligious diversity and include experiential learning, including examples that are relevant 
to the contemporary reality and situations that children face in and out of school.
Indicator 2.2 
INTEGRATION OF THE 
COUNTRY’S IMMIGRATION 
HISTORY IN NATIONAL 
HISTORY CURRICULA
LOW – non tolerance
The national history narrative reflects only the majority view point. There is no consid-
eration of the contribution of immigrants in the making (past or present) of the nation 
or the state. 
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There is an acknowledgement of the multi-ethnic or multi-cultural or multi-religious 
composition of the nation. But there is no appreciation of multiple perspectives in the 
national narrative and in particular of migrants’ experiences of inequality, discrimina-
tion or exploitation.
HIGH – acceptance 
The national history curriculum has been or is being revised to accommodate for the 
experiences immigrant groups. Tensions and alternative viewpoints are given due con-
sideration and the critical role of history as making sense of our past, present and future 
is emphasised.
Indicator 2.3 
INTEGRATION OF THE 
COUNTRY’S HISTORICAL 
MINORITIES IN THE 
NATIONAL HISTORY 
CURRICULUM
LOW – non tolerance
The national history narrative reflects only the majority view point. There is no consid-
eration of the contribution of native minorities in the making (past or present) of the 
nation or the state.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There is an acknowledgement of the multi-ethnic or multi-cultural or multi-religious 
composition of the nation. But there is no appreciation of multiple perspectives in the 
national narrative and in particular of native minority historical experiences of domi-
nation and inequality or discrimination. Accounts of past events, heroes and national 
myths adopt only the dominant majority perspective.
HIGH – acceptance 
The national history curriculum has been or is being revised to accommodate for the 
experiences of minority groups. Tensions and alternative viewpoints are given due con-








(For schools that are 
completely secularised this 
indicator does not apply)
LOW – non tolerance
Religion courses include the teaching of the majority religion and not just history of 
religions. The majority view point is dominant (the majority religion is the only true 
religion, other religious traditions if taught, are clearly signalled as misguided and 
‘wrong’). Religion classes are compulsory and no alternative courses are offered.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Pupils can be exempted from religion classes upon request by their parents. No alterna-
tive arrangements are made to accommodate their special requests or needs.
HIGH – acceptance 
When a sufficient number of pupils requests alternative arrangements, instruction in 
other religions is offered including also philosophy classes for children whose parents 





CLASSES FOR NATIvE 
MINORITIES
LOW – non tolerance
No teaching of their mother tongue for children from large minority groups.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Teaching of mother tongue for native minority children can be arranged within school 
premises and hours but is not paid for/subsidised by the state. Parents have to contrib-
ute for the payment of teachers and/or education materials (books etc).
HIGH – acceptance 
Minority language teaching and specific courses taught in mother tongue of migrants/
minorities. In other words not only minority/migrant mother tongue is taught but it is 
also used as a medium for instruction in other courses.




(This indicator is about the 
option of creating non-
governmental-schools 
on the basis of a religious 
denomination, whether 
(partially) funded or not)
LOW – non tolerance
There are virtually no non-governmental schools catering to specific religious or eth-
nic/national groups in the entire country/region, at least not for children (5-16) and at 
least not recognized as constituting a way of fulfilling compulsory education.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There are non-governmental schools catering to specific religious or ethnic/national 
groups (accredited), but these do not (or hardly) receive public funding AND/OR they 
have very little meaningful “associational freedoms” AND/OR it is very difficult for 
newcomers and minorities to create such schools.
HIGH – acceptance 
There are non-governmental schools catering to specific religious or ethnic/national 
groups, they receive (substantial) public funding, they have (substantial ) associational 
freedoms), there are schools for religious (immigrant) newcomers and minorities.
Indicator 3.2 
DESEGREGATION
LOW – non tolerance
De facto or state-sponsored segregation in classrooms and/or schools against the wishes 
of the local minority. Minority children denied equal access to educational institutions 
that meet basic standards.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Various efforts made at desegregation, but with minimal impact on larger problem. 
Some minority children integrated into special schools targeted for desegregation poli-
cies, but most minority students remain in segregated classrooms/schools.
HIGH – acceptance 
Sustained system-wide desegregation efforts to combat segregation in classroom and 




LOW – non tolerance
There is a systematic neglect of the needs of schools in socio-economically deprived 
areas, even where those schools are shown to be unable to meet basic standards of edu-
cational provision. Opportunities for socio-economic integration of minority/migrant 
children are minimal to non-existent.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Some targeted funding for schools in socio-economically deprived areas meeting mini-
mum standards of provision. Increased opportunities for educational and socio-eco-
nomic advancement for minority children (though still severely limited).
HIGH – acceptance 
Robust investment strategy in schools in socio-economically deprived areas. Often 
combined with desegregation efforts in practice. Programmes targeting pupils in these 
schools to increase opportunities for educational and socio-economic advancement.
INDICATOR 3
Structure of the education system





LOW – non tolerance
Minority or immigrant teachers/staff are not hired.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Minority teachers/staff are incorporated but are not given any preference even in 
schools/areas where minorities are numerically predominant.
HIGH – acceptance 
Statewide hiring practices that give preferential treatment to minority teachers/staff. 
Typically combined with changes to curriculum that place emphasis on minority cul-
ture. Increased opportunities for advancement for minority teachers/staff, also role 




LOW – non tolerance
Teachers are given no specific instruction in how to deal with minority children or 
recognise racist/prejudicial treatment of minority children. The result is racism, and 
prejudicial treatment from both majority children and teachers go unchecked.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Minimal provision of teacher training to combat racism in schools and the classroom. 
Programmes in place but lacking the strong support of the state and school administra-
tors. Effects minimal.
HIGH – acceptance 
All teachers are subject to training (retraining) in sensitivity to cultural difference. 
Measurable reduction in prejudicial and racist treatment in the classroom. Increased 
equality and respect for minority children.
Indicator 3.6
PROMOTING A CULTURE 
OF ANTI-RACISM AND 
NON-DISCRIMINATION
LOW – non tolerance
Anti-discrimination regulations have not been put in place or those that have been 
adopted within the respective educational systems remain largely ineffectual in ad-
dressing differential treatment and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion. 
State bodies make no systematic or serious effort to monitor the effects of racism.
 MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Anti-discrimination regulations exist but are not strongly enforced and not properly 
monitored.
Racism and open forms of discrimination are disavowed and there are some mecha-
nisms in place to address and monitor visible acts. 
HIGH – acceptance (effective application/enforcement and control of the anti-discrimina-
tion regulations in place)
Anti-discrimination regulations are enforced effectively and properly monitored. 
There is concern not just with acts of discrimination but also with the institutional cul-
ture of the educational system and how it impacts upon the prospects and well-being 
of minority children. 
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Indicator 4: Tolerance of intolerant discourses and practices in political life
  What are the limits of intolerance in the political life of European countries? 





Indicator 5:  Local or national policies of exclusion of minorities and immigrants from public life
  The institutional limitations of the respect of minorities’ rights. We study in particular
	 •	Rules	concerning	the	establishment	of	places	of	worship
	 •	Policies	concerning	ethnic	businesses
Indicator 6: Special arrangements for the representation of minorities/immigrants





3.2 Tolerance in Politics Indicators
Our Tolerance in politics indicators are organised by reference to the various 
aspects of political life and seek to take into account the various dilemmas, claims 
and contested issues that may arise in the sphere of politics in the countries studied. 
They are based on our empirical and theoretical analysis of political challenges in 
the 16 European countries studied face when dealing with ethnic, cultural and reli-
gious diversity. They are thus organised into three sets:
All indicators are preceded by the following question: 
Which of the following sentences best reflects best the political life in your country?
Indicators are assessed by researchers on the basis of data collected concerning 
relevant policies, practices and discourses. 
In the ACCEPT PLURALISM project, we implement these indicators in a 
pilot study on the basis mainly of the data collected during our case studies on 
political and public life and supported by relevant scholarly literature or survey 
data where necessary. This pilot study applies the three sets of indicators in selected 
countries, namely those where there are significant challenges in the area in ques-
tion.
If the indicators were to be used to assess past conditions or re-used in the future 
to assess in the future, they should still be assessed by experts (be they researchers 
or policy makers) on the basis of a focused and contextual analysis. 
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Indicator 4.1
ExISTENCE OF LEGISLATION 
THAT PUNISHES RACIST 
DISCOURSE
LOW – non tolerance
Legislation punishing racist discourse and actions, or incitement to ethnic or religious 
hatred does not exist or is inadequate for current challenges of cultural, ethnic and reli-
gious diversity in the given country.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Legislation exists but includes clauses that make it difficult to apply (e.g.: it requires for 
proofs that are very difficult to obtain; or it requires that racism must have been the only 
motivation of an action or speech, etc.).
HIGH – acceptance 
Legislation exists, is up to standard and is applied without important legal or procedural 
problems. 
Indicator 4.2
APPLICATION OF SUCH 
LEGISLATION IN RECENT 
TIMES 
(period of reference: 
last 10 years)
LOW – non tolerance
The legislation exists but has never been applied.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The legislation exists but so far cases brought to court have shown that (a) the law is 
problematic (because of its loopholes or its restrictive nature); or (b) there is tacit reluc-
tance to apply the law and convict the perpetrators; or (c) both (a) and (b).
HIGH – acceptance 
The legislation exists and is consistently applied.
Indicator 4.3




(The short term ‘far right 
parties’ is used to refer to 
parties that are extreme 
right and engage into anti-
immigrant or anti-minority 
discourse and actions. They 
may qualify even for just one 
of those issues i.e. being of 
far right and/or being anti-
immigrant and/or being anti-
minority, e.g. anti-Roma)
LOW – non tolerance
Far right parties exist and have gained more than the minimal threshold for entering 
Parliament in the last national election.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Far right parties exist and have gained between 1% and the minimum threshold for 
entering Parliament in the last national election.
HIGH – acceptance 
Far right parties if they exist at all gained less than 1% of the national vote in the last 
national election.
INDICATOR 4
Tolerance of intolerant discourses and practices in political life





LOW – non tolerance
Public life is characterised by frequent incidents of racist violence against ethnic minor-
ity or immigrant individuals (or groups of people) because of their ethnic affiliation. 
According to NGOs, state authorities and other sources there have been more than 3 
incidents of ethnically motivated racist violence per 1 million people in the country 
during the last year.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Racist violence against individuals or groups of people of ethnic minority or immigrant 
origin is a rare incident. There has been between 1 and 3 such incidents per 1 mil-
lion people monitored during the last year. There are campaigns against such ethnically 
motivated racist violence but they are small campaigns of left wing or pro immigrant 
organisations without a massive appeal.
HIGH – acceptance 
There have been between 0 and 1 incidents per 1 million people of racist violence 
against ethnic minority or immigrant individuals (or groups of people) because of their 
ethnic affiliation during the last year and there are massive initiatives against racism 
involving several stakeholders (both state and civil society).
Indicator 4.5
RACIST vIOLENCE 
IN PUbLIC LIFE 
(RELIGIOUSLY MOTIvATED)
LOW – non tolerance
Public life is characterised by frequent incidents of racist violence against religious mi-
nority individuals (or groups of people) because of their faith. According to NGOs, 
state authorities and other sources there have been more than 3 incidents of religiously 
motivated racist violence per 1 million people in the country during the last year.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Racist violence against individuals or groups of people of a minority religion is a rare 
incident. There has been between 1 and 3 such incidents per 1 million people moni-
tored during the last year. There are campaigns against such racist violence but they are 
small campaigns of left wing or pro immigrant organisations without a massive appeal.
HIGH – acceptance 
There have been between 0 and 1 incidents of racist violence per 1 million people 
against religious minority individuals (or groups of people) because of their different 
faith during the last year and there are massive initiatives against racism involving sev-
eral stakeholders (both state and civil society).
Indicator 4.6
INFLUENCE OF RADICAL 
FAR RIGHT OR ANTI-
IMMIGRANT PARTIES
LOW – non tolerance
The current government either subscribes to radical far-right and/or anti-immigrant 
views, or relies to a significant extent on the support of parties representing such views. 
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Radical far-right or anti-immigrant parties have no direct impact on government, but 
ruling parties may offer concessions to such parties in order to gain their support.
HIGH – acceptance 
Radical far right parties are marginalized and/or contained. There is no collaboration or 
mutual support between them and the parties in government.
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Indicator 4.7
MEDIA MAINSTREAMING 
OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT OR 
ANTI-MINORITY POSITIONS 
(To be assessed on the basis 
of existing studies-media 
surveys)
LOW – non tolerance
The understanding that there has been ‘too much tolerance’ of migrants/minorities 
and/or that there is ‘too much diversity’ dominates mainstream public debate and 
mainstream media. Such understandings are prominently rehearsed by mainstream 
politicians and inform governmental agendas.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There is a mixed picture of pro- and anti-migrant/minority rhetoric and both positions, 
in public debate, the media and on governmental agendas, have supporters and defend-
ers of relatively similar size. While notions such as ‘too much tolerance’ and ‘too much 
diversity’ have some traction, their political impact is limited.
HIGH – acceptance 





LOW – non tolerance
Minority religious groups are not allowed to have any public places for worship, formal 
or informal. 
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Minority religious groups are allowed to have informal places for worship or are allowed 
to have formal places of worship but requirements are so stringent that in practice this 
is not possible. Informal public places of worship are however de facto tolerated.
HIGH – acceptance 
Minority religious groups can have their formal places of worship.
Indicator 5.2
SPECIAL REqUIREMENTS 
FOR ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS 
bUSINESS
LOW – non tolerance
The municipality imposes very stringent requirements regarding opening hours or 
types of business with a view of driving out of the area businesses that are typically 
ethnic or religious such as corner shops which stay open late, ethnic restaurants or 
butchers providing for halal meat.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The municipality does not impose requirements and restrictions, and provides no sub-
sidies and support. Minority or ethnic businesses operate as any other business.
HIGH – acceptance 
The municipality provides for subsidies and support to ensure that shops that are cater-
ing to the needs of specific minority or immigrant groups (e.g. halal butcher shops or 
other types of shops) exist in the area. The municipality sees such ethnic entrepreneur-
ship and the existence of such shops as an added values for the neighbourhood recog-
nizing the diversity of its population and perhaps even creating ‘business’ by the local 
and tourist population.
INDICATOR 5
Local or national policies of exclusion of minorities and immigrants from public life
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Indicator 6.1
ExISTENCE OF OFFICIAL 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE 
REPRESENTATION OF 
NATIvE ETHNIC OR 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
LOW – non tolerance
There are no such official institutions for the representation of native ethnic or religious 
minority groups.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There are such official institutions but are only of a consultative character. They have no 
real administrative or political power. 
HIGH – acceptance 
There are such official institutions and they have real administrative and political pow-
er. They form part of the national political system under special arrangements to ac-
count for their special status (e.g. territorial concentration, representing people with 
particular living and working conditions (e.g. nomadic), numerical size very small and 
would otherwise not be represented in national bodies).
Indicator 6.2
ExISTENCE OF OFFICIAL 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE 
REPRESENTATION OF 
MIGRANTS
(e.g. local migrant councils)
LOW – non tolerance
There are no such official institutions for the representation of migrants at local or na-
tional level.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There are such official institutions but are only of a consultative character. They have no 
power. Their role mainly pertains to migration related issues not to mainstream issues.
HIGH – acceptance 
There are such official institutions and they have real administrative local political 
power (migrants here are intended as non citizens but they may be able to vote at local 
elections). They form part of the national political system and consider both migration 
related and mainstream general issues.
Indicator 6.3
ExISTENCE OF PROvISIONS 
FOR MINORITY CANDIDATES 
AT THE PARTY LEvEL
LOW – non tolerance
There are no special provisions by political parties (e.g. in terms of selecting candidates 
in specific electoral districts or at national level) for ensuring that some ethnic or reli-
gious minority candidates will be elected and participate in government.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
The practice of providing for the selection of ethnic or religious minority candidates in 
specific districts is standard for political parties, but there is no institutional provision 
for such a practice.
HIGH – acceptance 
There are ethnic and/or religious quotas in political parties (e.g. in terms of support-
ing a minority candidate in specific districts and/or at the national level to ensure that 
minority voices are represented in governance and politics).
Indicator 6.4
LOCAL vOTING RIGHTS 
FOR NON NATIONALS
LOW – non tolerance
No local voting rights for non nationals.
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Local voting rights for non nationals subject to 5 or more years of residence, with addi-
tional requirements (e.g. a certain type of permit), and/or subject to reciprocity clauses 
(i.e. that the country of origin reciprocates such rights).
HIGH – acceptance 
Local voting rights for non nationals exist for people who have been living in the coun-
try for 5 years or less without any special additional requirements.
INDICATOR 6
Special arrangements for the representation of minorities/immigrants




LOW – non tolerance
Minority mobilizations or claims-making are generally considered illegitimate and/or 
formally disqualified. There is no place in political life for positions or grievances that 
are articulated on the basis of minority identities or concerns. 
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
There are no formal mechanisms to exclude a minority presence in politics, but an 
atmosphere that discourages activist from emphasizing concerns and grievances that 
specifically pertain to their minority position. 
HIGH – acceptance 
Political claims and grievances that are put forward by minority/immigrant groups are 
considered to be as valid as any other political position. Minority groups are free to take 






LOW – non tolerance
Politicians of migrant or native minority background are not represented or severely 
underrepresented in parliament (the proportion of representatives in parliament is less 
than one third of the overall proportion of ethnic or native minority groups in society).
MEDIUM – minimal tolerance 
Politicians of migrant or native minority background are present, but underrepresented 
in parliament (proportion of representatives in parliament is between one third and 
two thirds).
HIGH – acceptance 
Politicians of migrant or native minority background are fully or almost fully repre-
sented in parliament (more than two thirds).
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